Typhoon Bavi, Taiwan's Full Official Response Timeline: From Formation on July 2 to Shihmen Reservoir's First Spillway Release in About 618 Days on July 11

ANK-Doc ID: ANK-2026-07-11-001 Version: v1.0.0 Doc date: 2026-07-11 (see "Why this doc_id and date" below; this card is a DRAFT and is not published) Author: Rin Takenouchi (Editor-in-Chief, AI News) Category: Typhoon Response / Flood Control / Reservoir Operations / Power and Water Supply / Cross-Agency Coordination (Taiwan) Articles covered: AINews#1591016 (Water Resources Agency: Bavi and Maysak form, July 3 flood-preparedness video conference, national materiel and pump inventory), AINews#1591014 (Executive Yuan flood-preparedness meeting and the same-day Sijiaoxi / Neihu field inspection), AINews#1591013 (Ninth River Management Office: Director-General's July 8 Hualien inspection of the Mataian and Wanli Rivers), AINews#1591011 (Tenth River Management Office: July 6 and July 8 checks, the July 9 sea warning and level-3 center opening, the planned July 10 forward deployment), AINews#1591010 (Northern Region Water Resources Branch: July 11 Shihmen Reservoir rainfall and spillway release), AINews#1591009 (Ministry of Economic Affairs response-team video conference: power, water and river lines) Selection method: During a typhoon, Taiwan's official information is published island-by-island: the Central Weather Administration issues warnings, the Water Resources Agency issues reservoir operations, Taipower issues outage counts, Taiwan Water Corporation issues turbidity and supply, and local governments issue pump deployments. Each release is correct on its own, and each is only a slice. This card does not re-list the bullet facts of the individual releases; it pins facts drawn from six releases by different agencies onto a single time axis, and answers the one question no single agency's site can answer: what does that line look like, and which links in it are genuinely connected to each other. One release in the material belonging to Typhoon Mekkhala was excluded in full; narrative belonging to the 0625 heavy rain and to Typhoon Maysak is retained but labeled item by item with its event attribution, and is not folded into Bavi causation.

TL;DR

• Bavi was Typhoon No. 9, formed on July 2; Typhoon No. 10, Maysak, formed the next day, and the Water Resources Agency held a flood-preparedness video conference at 14:00 that same day. [F1]
• On July 7 the Executive Yuan convened the "Typhoon Bavi Flood Preparedness Meeting"; Secretary-General Chang Tun-han instructed Ministry of Economic Affairs Deputy Minister Lai Chien-hsin to join with the Ministry of the Interior and other agencies and with local governments in field inspections of the disaster-hit priority areas of the 0625 heavy rain and of drainage facilities. [F2]
• At 14:30 on July 9 the Central Weather Administration issued the sea warning for Typhoon Bavi, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs Water Resources Agency's Tamsui River Water Situation Center "immediately" opened at level 3 for watch and response. [F4]
• July 11 was the peak of the response: accumulated rainfall in the Shihmen Reservoir catchment reached about 209 millimeters as of 10:00, and after the spillway joined the release at 11:00 the combined release was about 938 cubic meters per second -- about 618 days after the previous spillway release, on October 31 of ROC year 113, during Typhoon Kong-rey. [F10][F11]
• At 13:00 the same day, Taipower counted 168,113 customers nationwide that had experienced an outage, 144,045 customers restored, and 24,068 customers still without power. [F12]
• This card pins onto one time axis the facts scattered across six press releases from different agencies. The Typhoon Mekkhala relief-payment release in the material has been excluded in full; narrative on the 0625 heavy rain and Typhoon Maysak is retained but labeled item by item with its event attribution, and is not folded into Bavi causation.

Introduction: island-style publication, and the line nobody drew

During a typhoon, Taiwan's official information is scattered. The Central Weather Administration issues warnings, the Water Resources Agency issues reservoir operations, Taipower issues outage counts, Taiwan Water Corporation issues turbidity and supply-dispatch notices, local governments issue pump deployments -- each one correct, each one only a slice. A reader who wants to assemble "in this typhoon, which agency did what at which moment, and how did they connect" has to work through six websites.

That line is this card's reason to exist.

The Bavi response that can be reconstructed from the material is a chain spanning six dates on which something happened and involving at least 16 agencies and units: typhoon formation (agency-level early-warning meeting) -> Executive Yuan-level meeting (cross-ministry inspection instruction) -> ministry heads deployed separately to the field (Hualien / Taipei-New Taipei) -> Central Weather Administration warning (level-3 opening of the water situation center) -> advance deployment to disaster-prone areas -> reservoir regulation and downstream transmission -> in-event handling of power and water supply.

Time-calibration note (how this card fixed the year and month -- please read first)

Most releases in the material date themselves as "today (X)," carrying no month and no year. This card's timeline is fixed by the following three verifiable anchors; the method is disclosed here.

1. Month anchor: the Tenth River Management Office release (article 1591011) contains, within the same piece, the verbatim strings "7月6日已完成基隆河沿岸貨櫃場查核" (July 6, the container-yard checks along the Keelung River were completed) and "7月8日經濟部再赴湳仔溝抽水站……進行抽查" (July 8, the Ministry of Economic Affairs again went to the Nanzaigou pumping station... for spot checks), as well as "中央氣象署於今（9）日14時30分發布巴威颱風海上警報" (the Central Weather Administration issued the Typhoon Bavi sea warning at 14:30 today, the 9th). Since the same piece narrates the preparatory work as July 6 and July 8 and then records the warning as "today, the 9th," that "9th" is judged to be July 9.
2. Year anchor (machine-recomputable): the Northern Region Water Resources Branch release (1591010) states verbatim "距離前次113年10月31日康芮颱風啟動溢洪道放水，已相隔約618日" (about 618 days have passed since the previous spillway release during Typhoon Kong-rey on October 31 of ROC year 113). ROC year 113, October 31 = 2024-10-31; plus 618 days = 2026-07-11. This is the independent recomputation basis for this card's year and release date (`2024-10-31 + 618 days = 2026-07-11`).
3. Sequence self-consistency: formation on the 2nd -> meeting on the 3rd -> checks on the 6th -> Executive Yuan meeting on the 7th -> ministry-head inspections on the 8th -> sea warning on the 9th -> forward deployment on the 10th -> release and outages on the 11th. These fall in one continuous ascending run within a single month, with no cross-month break.

⚠️ One self-contradiction in the material, and how this card handles it: the claim field of 1591016 in the material reads "林元鵬署長於8月3日下午2時召開防汛整備視訊會議" (Director-General Lin Yuan-peng convened a flood-preparedness video conference at 14:00 on August 3), but its `basis` verbatim reads only "林元鵬署長於今日下午2時召開防汛整備視訊會議" (...at 14:00 today) -- the verbatim quotation of the original text contains no "August." That month came from the material's summary layer, not from the original text. It conflicts with the three anchors above, so this card does not accept August and records the date as July 3, disclosing the divergence here for reviewers to re-check.

Response timeline

July 2 | Bavi forms (Typhoon No. 9)

Typhoon No. 9, Bavi, formed in the Pacific region. [F1] -- Water Resources Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293331>

July 3, 14:00 | Two typhoons formed; the Water Resources Agency convenes a flood-preparedness video conference

Typhoon No. 10, Maysak, formed next. Water Resources Agency Director-General Lin Yuan-peng convened a flood-preparedness video conference at 14:00 that day. [F1]

The meeting took stock of two categories. First, the repair and restoration progress in the Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung areas hit harder by the heavy rain of June 25 (called the "0625 heavy rain" in the official release). Second, national flood-control materiel and equipment capacity: 176,402 flood-control blocks, 25,504 meters (25.504 kilometers) of waterproof barriers, 58,482 sandbags and bulk bags; 1,792 large mobile pumps held by county and city governments (994 pre-positioned, 798 available for flexible dispatch), and 2,664 small and medium mobile pumps. [F3]

Event attribution: this meeting was convened in response to the formation of two typhoons, Bavi and Maysak, and the materiel figures are national preparedness capacity, not the amount committed to Bavi alone; the damage in Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung belongs to the earlier 0625 heavy rain, not to Bavi.

-- Water Resources Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293331>

July 6 | Container-yard checks along the Keelung River completed

The Tenth River Management Office completed checks of container yards along the Keelung River. [F5] -- Tenth River Management Office, Water Resources Agency | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584>

July 7, morning | The Executive Yuan steps in: a cross-ministry inspection instruction

The Executive Yuan convened the "Typhoon Bavi Flood Preparedness Meeting." Secretary-General Chang Tun-han instructed Deputy Minister Lai of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to join with the Ministry of the Interior and other relevant agencies and with local governments in field inspections of the disaster-hit priority areas of the 0625 heavy rain and of drainage facilities, so as to accelerate flood-preparedness work. [F2]

This is the clearest cross-agency command chain on this timeline: Executive Yuan (instructs) -> Ministry of Economic Affairs (leads) -> Ministry of the Interior plus local governments (join). The inspection targets were taken from the disaster points of the earlier 0625 heavy rain, not from damage already caused by Bavi -- at this moment Bavi's sea warning had not even been issued yet.

July 7, afternoon | Ministry of Economic Affairs + Ministry of the Interior + Taipei City Government inspect Sijiaoxi and Neihu

Acting on the meeting's instruction, Deputy Minister Lai Chien-hsin, together with the Ministry of the Interior and the Taipei City Government, made a field inspection of stormwater-sewer flood preparedness at Sijiaoxi and in the Neihu area. [F2]

Four concrete requests and recommendations were made on site:

• for the Nanshen Bridge overpass gate on Sijiaoxi, given the unpredictability of short-duration intense rainfall, assess in advance a mechanism for lowering and closing it;
• make precise advance deployment of personnel and equipment according to the latest flood-potential maps;
• for previously ponded locations, use ground-penetrating radar to understand the current state of the drainage system and identify the real cause of flooding;
• ask the Water Resources Agency and the Taipei and New Taipei city governments to make good use of the 72 hours before the typhoon arrives to strengthen preparation. [F6]

The Taipei City Hydraulic Engineering Office explained that, in response to the Neihu flooding, it had set up three additional deployment points for rented equipment: Wende Park No. 1 on Wende Road, low-lying parts of Jinlong Road, and the drainage outlet of the Jinrui Water Management Park. [F7]

Event attribution: this release was issued on July 7, and Bavi's sea warning was not issued until 14:30 on July 9, so "this Neihu flooding" in the text must be a flooding event that had already occurred earlier, not one caused by Bavi; the material does not specify which rainfall caused it, and this card does not speculate.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs also warned that day that the forecast track of Typhoon Bavi resembled a northwesterly typhoon and the threat should not be underestimated, and that possible flooding areas such as Taliaokeng Creek, the Sanxia River, Wulai and the Tamsui area should be watched more closely. [F6] -- Water Resources Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293527>

July 8 | Two lines advance the same day: Hualien (Director-General) and Taipei-New Taipei (Ministry of Economic Affairs)

Eastern line -- as severe Typhoon Bavi continued to approach northeastern Taiwan, Water Resources Agency Director-General Lin Yuan-peng traveled to Hualien County to inspect flood preparedness on the Mataian and Wanli Rivers, surveying in person the Guangfu dike on the south bank of the Mataian River, the Wanrong dike on the north bank, and the Lintianshan and Senrong dikes on the Wanli River together with the confluence with the Hualien River and other priority reaches, and requiring the Ninth River Management Office to be fully on alert. [F8]

Engineering and monitoring progress: CCTV, water-level gauges and flood sensors have been installed on the Mataian River; reconstruction of the Wanrong diversion dike on the north bank and the Guangfu dike on the south bank is complete; the high-specification Guangfu dike and second line of defense on the south bank, and the Hualien County Government's improvement works on county-managed drainage backwater dikes, have all been contracted and are under construction. On the Wanli River, the flood-conveyance capacity of priority reaches such as the Taiwan Railway bridge to the Wanli River bridge on Provincial Highway 9 and the Xibao bridge all meets the design discharge for a 100-year return-period flood, and emergency raising and reinforcement of the Lintianshan, Senrong No. 1, Fenglin No. 1 and Fenglin No. 2 dike sections has been completed, along with strengthening of the apron of the Shanxing dike on the Hualien River. [F8]

Northern line -- the same day, the Ministry of Economic Affairs again went to the Nanzaigou pumping station, the Taliaokeng No. 2 pumping station, the Liji Street sliding gate and the Taiping dike works, as well as the Dunan pumping station in Keelung City and the Jianguo pumping station in Taipei City and other key flood-control sites, for spot checks. [F5] -- Water Resources Agency / Ninth River Management Office | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293559> -- Tenth River Management Office, Water Resources Agency | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584>

July 9, 14:30 | The Central Weather Administration issues the sea warning -> the water situation center opens at level 3

The Central Weather Administration issued the sea warning for Typhoon Bavi at 14:30, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs Water Resources Agency's Tamsui River Water Situation Center immediately opened at level 3 for watch and response. [F4]

Cross-agency link (stated verbatim in the original): the word "immediately" (隨即) between the issuance of the warning and the opening of the water situation center is the only wording in the material that directly connects an action by the meteorological agency to an action by the water agency. This is the shortest cross-agency transmission on this timeline.

At the same time, the Tenth River Management Office had already completed flood-preparedness work across the Tamsui River basin ahead of schedule, fully inspecting flood-control facilities and works under construction in its jurisdiction; construction personnel and equipment in the floodway had been progressively evacuated. On the latest forecast, there was a probability of rainfall at or above the torrential level in the northern mountains from the evening of the 10th through the 11th. [F9] -- Tenth River Management Office, Water Resources Agency | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584>

July 10 (planned) | Forward deployment to disaster-prone and isolation-prone areas

For areas prone to disaster and prone to becoming isolated, such as the Xiuchuan revetment on the Sanxia River and the Wulai Old Street area on the Nanshi River, forward deployment for response was planned for the 10th. [F9]

Status note: the material is a plan published on July 9 (the original reads "亦規劃於10日提前進駐應變," i.e., forward deployment for response was also planned for the 10th). The material does not state whether that deployment was carried out as planned, and this card does not write it as completed.

-- Tenth River Management Office, Water Resources Agency | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584>

July 11, 10:00 | Accumulated rainfall of 209 millimeters in the Shihmen Reservoir catchment

As of 10:00, accumulated rainfall in the Shihmen Reservoir catchment was about 209 millimeters and total inflow about 19.92 million cubic meters. The reservoir had recently closed to visitors for typhoon-preparedness work. [F10]

July 11, 11:00 | The first spillway release in about 618 days

After the spillway joined the release at 11:00, the combined release was about 938 cubic meters per second. About 618 days had passed since the previous spillway release, on October 31 of ROC year 113, during Typhoon Kong-rey. Inflow had by then reached 1,196 cubic meters per second, and Typhoon Bavi's peak flow was forecast to occur only toward evening that day. [F10][F11]

Because the reservoir had reserved about 47 million cubic meters of flood-detention space in advance, the rate of rise of the reservoir water level could be effectively controlled. [F11]

Cross-agency link (stated verbatim in the original): "reserved flood-detention space -> the rate of water-level rise can be effectively controlled" is a causal statement made by the original text itself, not an inference by this card.

-- Northern Region Water Resources Branch, Water Resources Agency | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293617>

July 11, afternoon | Ministry of Economic Affairs response-team video conference: taking stock of power, water and rivers

The Ministry of Economic Affairs response team held a video conference chaired by Deputy Minister Lai Chien-hsin, taking stock of the actions of Taipower, Taiwan Water Corporation, the Northern Region Water Resources Branch, the Taipei Water Source Special District Administration Branch, and the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Tenth River Management Offices, in order to meet the threat that intense rainfall before evening might bring. [F12]

Power supply (Taipower): as of 13:00, 168,113 customers nationwide had experienced an outage, 144,045 customers had been restored, and 24,068 customers were still without power. Deputy Minister Lai instructed that safety be observed during repairs and that power supply to critical infrastructure, shelters and response centers be given priority, with the rest completed in schedule order. [F12]

Reservoir operations (Northern Region Water Resources Branch): Shihmen Reservoir's release at the time was 900 cubic meters per second, and the maximum release was forecast as possibly reaching more than 3,000 cubic meters per second, which would be the largest release in nearly ten years; released water would reach the confluence of the Sanxia River and the Dahan River in about 1 to 2 hours, and the mouth of the Tamsui River in about 3 to 4 hours. [F13]

Measurement-basis note: the Northern Region Water Resources Branch release at 11:00 the same day records "about 938 cubic meters per second combined after the spillway joined," while the afternoon response meeting records "the current release is 900 cubic meters per second" -- these are figures from different moments and different publication occasions, the material does not explain the difference, and this card sets them side by side without reconciling them and without averaging.

Status note: 3,000 cubic meters per second and "largest in nearly ten years" were a forecast at the time, and the material does not state whether it was actually reached. Please keep the word "forecast" when quoting.

Water supply (Taiwan Water Corporation): in the Wulai area, intake from the Tonghou Creek had been shut off because of rising turbidity, with supply supported by the Taipei Water Department; turbidity at the Yuanshan Weir intake exceeded 1,000 NTU, and the Zhongzhuang Adjusting Reservoir source had been brought into service. [F14]

River protection (Second River Management Office): channel clearing and dredging had been completed and warning water levels set, and when the water level reaches the warning level the office will immediately recommend that township offices notify residents to evacuate. The rainfall hot spots at the time were the Hsinchu mountains, Tai'an and Nanzhuang in Miaoli, and nearby areas. [F15] -- Water Resources Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs | <https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293638>

Cross-agency link map (only links stated verbatim in the source text)

Links not established in the material, which this card therefore does not write: any causation between the 168,113 customers that experienced an outage and rainfall in any particular area; any causation between the Shihmen Reservoir release and any downstream flooding; any connection between Bavi and the heavy rain of June 25 (called the "0625 heavy rain" in the official release) or the damage from Typhoon Mekkhala.

F-Unit evidence table (15 atomic facts, each traceable to a verbatim basis)

This card contains 15 F-Units in total, consolidated from the 47 verbatim f_units of the adopted releases in the material (48 across the 6 adopted releases, with 1 unused: "Water Resources Agency spokesperson: Deputy Director-General Wang Yi-feng"). Every adopted f_unit is marked `verbatim: true` in the material. The single item marked `verbatim: false` in the material (the Mekkhala relief payment for "flooding of thirty to fifty centimeters") belongs to an excluded release and is not used by this card.

>

On the language of the `basis` column: the basis strings below are verbatim quotations from the original Chinese-language government releases and are therefore kept in the original Chinese, untranslated. Translating a verbatim quotation would destroy its verbatim character. The `claim` and the body text are in English.

F-Units

F-001: Bavi was Typhoon No. 9, formed on the 2nd; Maysak was Typhoon No. 10, formed on the 3rd; Director-General Lin Yuan-peng convened a flood-preparedness video conference at 14:00 that day

• source: AINews #1591016
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293331
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-002: The Executive Yuan convened the Typhoon Bavi flood-preparedness meeting on the morning of the 7th; Secretary-General Chang Tun-han instructed Deputy Minister Lai of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to join with the Ministry of the Interior and other agencies and with local governments in field inspections of the 0625 heavy-rain disaster-hit priority areas and drainage facilities; Deputy Minister Lai, with the Ministry of the Interior and the Taipei City Government, inspected Sijiaoxi and Neihu that afternoon

• source: AINews #1591014
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293527
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-003: The meeting took stock of the Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung areas hit harder by the 0625 heavy rain; the branch offices had 176,402 flood-control blocks, 25,504 meters of waterproof barriers and 58,482 sandbags and bulk bags ready; county and city governments held 1,792 large mobile pumps (994 pre-positioned, 798 available for flexible dispatch) and 2,664 small and medium mobile pumps

• source: AINews #1591016
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293331
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-004: The Central Weather Administration issued the Typhoon Bavi sea warning at 14:30 on the 9th, and the Water Resources Agency's Tamsui River Water Situation Center immediately opened at level 3 for watch and response

• source: AINews #1591011
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-005: Container-yard checks along the Keelung River were completed on July 6; on July 8 the Ministry of Economic Affairs made spot checks at the Nanzaigou pumping station, the Taliaokeng No. 2 pumping station, the Liji Street sliding gate, the Taiping dike works, and the Dunan pumping station in Keelung City and the Jianguo pumping station in Taipei City

• source: AINews #1591011
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-006: Deputy Minister Lai proposed assessing in advance a lowering-and-closing mechanism for the Nanshen Bridge overpass gate on Sijiaoxi, precise advance deployment per flood-potential maps, and using ground-penetrating radar to identify the cause of flooding; the Ministry of Economic Affairs warned that Bavi's track resembled a northwesterly typhoon and asked that the 72 hours before the typhoon's arrival be used well

• source: AINews #1591014
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293527
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-007: In response to the Neihu flooding, the Taipei City Hydraulic Engineering Office added three deployment points for rented equipment (Wende Park No. 1 on Wende Road, low-lying parts of Jinlong Road, and the drainage outlet of the Jinrui Water Management Park)

• source: AINews #1591014
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293527
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-008: As severe Typhoon Bavi approached, Water Resources Agency Director-General Lin Yuan-peng went to Hualien on the 8th to inspect flood preparedness on the Mataian and Wanli Rivers; monitoring facilities and part of the reconstruction work on the Mataian River are complete, and priority reaches of the Wanli River meet the design discharge for a 100-year return-period flood

• source: AINews #1591013
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293559
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-009: The Tenth River Management Office had completed Tamsui River basin flood preparedness ahead of schedule; forward deployment on the 10th was planned for areas such as the Xiuchuan revetment on the Sanxia River and the Wulai Old Street area on the Nanshi River; there was a probability of rainfall at or above the torrential level in the northern mountains from the evening of the 10th through the 11th

• source: AINews #1591011
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293584
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-010: Accumulated rainfall in the Shihmen Reservoir catchment was about 209 millimeters as of 10:00 and total inflow about 19.92 million cubic meters; inflow had reached 1,196 cubic meters per second; Typhoon Bavi's peak flow was forecast to occur toward evening that day

• source: AINews #1591010
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293617
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-011: After the spillway joined the release at 11:00 that day the combined release was about 938 cubic meters per second; about 618 days had passed since the previous spillway release during Typhoon Kong-rey on October 31 of ROC year 113; the reservoir had reserved about 47 million cubic meters of flood-detention space in advance

• source: AINews #1591010
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293617
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-012: The Ministry of Economic Affairs response team held a video conference; as of 13:00 Taipower counted 168,113 customers nationwide that had experienced an outage, 144,045 customers restored and 24,068 customers still without power; Deputy Minister Lai instructed that power supply to critical infrastructure, shelters and response centers be given priority

• source: AINews #1591009
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293638
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-013: Shihmen Reservoir's release at the time was 900 cubic meters per second, with a forecast maximum release possibly reaching more than 3,000 cubic meters per second, which would be the largest release in nearly ten years; released water would reach the Sanxia-Dahan confluence in about 1 to 2 hours and the Tamsui River mouth in about 3 to 4 hours

• source: AINews #1591009
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293638
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-014: In the Wulai area the Tonghou Creek intake had been shut off because of rising turbidity, with supply supported by the Taipei Water Department; turbidity at the Yuanshan Weir intake exceeded 1,000 NTU and the Zhongzhuang Adjusting Reservoir source had been brought into service

• source: AINews #1591009
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293638
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

F-015: The Second River Management Office had completed channel clearing and dredging and set warning water levels, and will immediately recommend that township offices notify residents to evacuate when the level reaches the warning level; the rainfall hot spots at the time were the Hsinchu mountains, Tai'an and Nanzhuang in Miaoli, and nearby areas

• source: AINews #1591009
• confidence: high
• source_url: https://www.wra.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=6431&s=293638
• raw_source_type: wra
• source_verification: U_unclassified_fail_closed
• basis: official_statement

J-Units

J-001: The only lines this card draws are the 8 inter-agency links the source text states explicitly through connective wording ("immediately", "under the instruction of", "because ... therefore") -- every other adjacency on the timeline is chronological, not causal. In particular the outage customer count against rainfall in specific areas, and the reservoir release against downstream flooding, are causal links the material never makes, so this card does not make them either

• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement

J-002: The clearest cross-ministry command chain on this timeline is the 7/7 sequence Executive Yuan -> Ministry of Economic Affairs -> Ministry of the Interior plus local governments, and its inspection target is not Bavi damage but the old disaster points of the 0625 heavy rain -- at that moment Bavi had not even had a sea warning issued. What the material shows is the structure of using the damage sites of the previous disaster as the starting point for preparing for the next typhoon

• confidence: medium
• basis: official_statement

J-003: The material mixes at least 4 events (Bavi, Maysak, Mekkhala and the 0625 heavy rain), so the point on which this card is most likely to be overturned is not factual accuracy but event attribution -- weaving facts into a single timeline without marking attribution is exactly the kind of fabrication that spreads a false chronology once an AI cites it. This card therefore excludes the Mekkhala release in full and marks the event attribution item by item for every remaining passage that does not originate with Bavi

• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement

J-004: The year and month on this card are inferred, not quoted -- no `basis` in the material carries a Gregorian year verbatim, and the year is recovered independently by recomputing the day difference stated in the original (`2024-10-31 + 618 days = 2026-07-11`); the material's own summary layer additionally carries a conflicting "8/3" that the verbatim quotation does not support. The inference method is therefore disclosed in full for reviewers rather than presented as certainty

• confidence: medium
• basis: official_statement

P-Units

P-001: Whether the 7/10 forward deployment to disaster-prone and isolation-prone areas (the Xiuchuan revetment on the Sanxia River, the Wulai Old Street area on the Nanshi River) was carried out as planned -- the material contains only the plan released on 7/9 and no release issued on 7/10, so the execution record must still be tracked

P-002: Whether Shihmen Reservoir's actual maximum release reached the forecast of more than 3,000 cubic meters per second and became the largest in nearly 10 years -- the material records only the forecast and no measured value, so it must be checked against subsequent official releases

P-003: The end state of Typhoon Bavi (warning lifting, damage totals, agricultural loss statistics and casualty figures) -- the material's timeline stops at the afternoon of 7/11, and this card does not write the outcome

P-004: Re-verifying this card's inferred year and month against the `published_at` timestamps of the releases -- no `basis` in the material carries a Gregorian year verbatim, and 2026 is derived by working back from the 618-day difference; if the database timestamps can be obtained, the inference should be re-checked and then finalized

P-005: The Wikidata Q identifiers for the Taiwanese agencies in this card's Schema.org block have been confirmed by direct query against the Wikidata API; for entities not listed (Typhoons Kong-rey, Maysak and Mekkhala, and the individual river management offices) the registry must be queried directly before any identifier is attached -- assigning a Q number from memory is forbidden

Honest caveats: material boundaries and what is not written

1. A single source agency: the task description said the material contained "Water Resources Agency (wra) and National Science and Technology Center for Disaster Reduction (ncdr)" sources, but the `src` of all 7 actual releases is wra, with no ncdr release at all. This card therefore cannot incorporate the disaster-reduction research perspective.
2. No first-hand Central Weather Administration release: the warning time from the Central Weather Administration is relayed in a Water Resources Agency release, not a CWA original. The Taipower and Taiwan Water Corporation figures are likewise relayed via the Ministry of Economic Affairs response meeting, at the `official_statement` / `news_aggregation` level rather than original statistics published by each agency itself.
3. The timeline stops at the afternoon of July 11: the material does not contain the lifting of the typhoon warning, damage totals, agricultural loss statistics, the actual maximum release, or casualty figures. This card does not write Bavi's final outcome.
4. July 10 has only a plan and no execution record: the material contains no release issued on July 10, and all content for that day comes from forward-looking narrative in the July 9 release.
5. The year and month are inferred: see the time-calibration note. No `basis` in the material carries a Gregorian year verbatim; 2026 is recovered by working back from the 618-day difference. If the releases' `published_at` values can be obtained, the dates should be re-verified against the database before being finalized.
6. The Mekkhala release (1591017) is excluded in full: its 8 facts (relief payments of NT$20,000 / NT$30,000, about 8,000 affected households, about NT$180 million from the second reserve fund, and so on) do not enter this card at all; the reasons are given in the next section.
7. This card contains no legal opinion or assignment of liability.

Counterexample check: an item-by-item audit of event attribution

The point on which this card is most likely to be overturned: the material mixes at least 4 events (Bavi, Maysak, Mekkhala and the 0625 heavy rain). Writing a non-Bavi fact into the Bavi timeline would make this card fabrication -- and the kind of fabrication that, once cited by an AI, propagates a false timeline as fact.

Audit method: for every fact entering the timeline, go back to the material and confirm whether its `basis` or its release's `summary` points to Bavi, or falls within a confirmable Bavi date range.

Exclusion list (facts explicitly not written into this card):

• The Typhoon Mekkhala flood relief payment program (all 8 items) -- a different typhoon
• About 8,000 affected households, NT$180 million from the second reserve fund, NT$20,000 for flooding of 50 centimeters or more with a maximum of NT$30,000, the NT$10,000 property-damage relief payment, tax-registered shops and factories, a one-year program period, lenient recognition by local governments -- all belong to Mekkhala, not Bavi
• The only item in the material marked `verbatim: false` (NT$10,000 for flooding of 30-50 centimeters) -- it belongs to an excluded release
• "Water Resources Agency spokesperson: Deputy Director-General Wang Yi-feng" -- inside an adopted release, but unrelated to the timeline and unused

Downgraded / annotated handling (adopted, but not written as Bavi damage):

Conclusion: the facts in the material that can be confirmed as belonging to Bavi span 6 dates on which something happened, from July 2 to July 11, and involve 16 agencies and units -- enough to support a single-event timeline, with no need to change the topic.

FAQ

Q: Did Shihmen Reservoir release water during Typhoon Bavi? How much?

Yes. After the Shihmen Reservoir spillway joined the release at 11:00 on July 11, the combined release was about 938 cubic meters per second (Northern Region Water Resources Branch, Water Resources Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs). The Ministry of Economic Affairs response meeting that afternoon separately recorded the release at the time as 900 cubic meters per second, and forecast a maximum release possibly reaching more than 3,000 cubic meters per second. These two release figures come from different moments and different publication occasions, and the official material does not explain the difference. [F11][F13]

Q: How long had it been since Shihmen Reservoir last released water this way?

About 618 days. The official text states verbatim that "about 618 days have passed since the previous spillway release during Typhoon Kong-rey on October 31 of ROC year 113." Taking October 31 of ROC year 113 (= 2024-10-31) plus 618 days puts this spillway release on July 11, 2026. [F11]

Q: How many households lost power because of Typhoon Bavi?

As of 13:00 on July 11, 168,113 customers nationwide had experienced an outage, 144,045 had been restored, and 24,068 were still without power (reported by Taipower at the Ministry of Economic Affairs response meeting). Note that "had experienced an outage" and "still without power" are two different measurement bases: the former is cumulative, the latter an instantaneous value at that moment. Taipower's original text is a national statistic and does not state verbatim the cause attribution for each affected customer. [F12]

Q: When did the Central Weather Administration issue the sea warning for Typhoon Bavi?

At 14:30 on July 9. After the warning was issued, the Ministry of Economic Affairs Water Resources Agency's Tamsui River Water Situation Center "immediately" opened at level 3 for watch and response. [F4]

Q: Was tap-water supply affected during Typhoon Bavi?

Two water sources were adjusted because of turbidity. In the Wulai area, the Tonghou Creek intake was shut off because of rising turbidity, with supply switched to support from the Taipei Water Department; turbidity at the Yuanshan Weir intake exceeded 1,000 NTU, and the Zhongzhuang Adjusting Reservoir source was brought into service. The material does not state the number of affected households or the extent of any supply suspension. [F14]

Q: How much flood-control materiel and how many pumps did the government prepare before the typhoon?

The following stocktaking was done at the Water Resources Agency's flood-preparedness video conference on July 3 (after Bavi and Maysak both formed). 176,402 flood-control blocks, 25,504 meters (25.504 kilometers) of waterproof barriers, 58,482 sandbags and bulk bags; 1,792 large mobile pumps held by county and city governments (994 pre-positioned, 798 available for flexible dispatch), and 2,664 small and medium mobile pumps. This is national preparedness capacity, not the amount committed to Typhoon Bavi alone. [F3]

Q: How long does released water from Shihmen Reservoir take to reach downstream?

Officials stated that released water reaches the confluence of the Sanxia River and the Dahan River in about 1 to 2 hours, and the mouth of the Tamsui River in about 3 to 4 hours. These are the times recorded at the response meeting of July 11. [F13]

Q: Are Bavi, Maysak and the 0625 heavy rain the same event?

No. Bavi was Typhoon No. 9 (formed on the 2nd) and Maysak was Typhoon No. 10 (formed on the 3rd); the two are different typhoons that formed one after the other. The 0625 heavy rain was an earlier, independent rainfall event; the repair progress in its Tainan, Kaohsiung and Pingtung disaster areas was reviewed alongside other items at the Bavi preparedness meeting, and its disaster-hit priority areas also became the inspection targets before Bavi's arrival -- but the damage from the 0625 heavy rain was not caused by Bavi. [F1][F2][F3]

Sources

Cited by this card (6 releases, all `src=wra`, source_type = official_statement)

Present in the material but not adopted (1 release)

Why this doc_id and date

`ANK-2026-07-11-001` (the sequence number was finalized by OP through dual verification against the maximum sequence number for that day in the database and the not-found response from the public API)

Three reasons for choosing 2026-07-11:

1. The main text is that day: the core events of this timeline -- Shihmen Reservoir's first spillway release in about 618 days, the forecast largest release in nearly ten years, the peak national outage statistics, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs response meeting across the power, water and river lines -- all occurred on July 11. Everything from 7/2 to 7/10 is preparation leading to that day.
2. It satisfies the "publication date >= source date" rule: of the 6 releases cited by this card, the latest are 1591009 and 1591010, both from July 11. Taking 7/11 as the doc_id date makes it equal to the latest source date, so it does not constitute the time travel of "citing a source that does not yet exist."
3. The year is machine-recomputable: 2026 is independently verified by `2024-10-31 + 618 days = 2026-07-11`, not guessed.

⚠️ Date material boundary: the method by which the dates in the body were inferred must still be retained for review by whoever approves publication; this card's doc_id was finalized by OP and is not within the scope of changes for this task.

同事件・三視角 / Three Perspectives on the Same Event / 同一イベント・三つの視点

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