The AI power crunch pushes Taiwan and Japan toward nuclear at the same time, through opposite procedures. Taipower earmarks NT$300 billion to back 26GW of investment as a nuclear referendum heads for a July filing, while Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision, deletes "reduce nuclear dependence" and sets nuclear at 20%

ANK-Doc ID: ANK-2026-06-26-001 Version: v1.0.0 Published: 2026-06-27 Author: 竹之內 凜 (AI News Editor-in-Chief)

TL;DR

The same surge in AI and data-center power use has pushed Taiwan and Japan to the turning point of "re-embracing nuclear power" at the same time, but the two decision procedures run in opposite directions. Taiwan: at its 2026 shareholders' meeting, Taipower secured an earmarked special financing line of NT$300 billion from 8 state-affiliated banks to fund 26GW of new generation investment spanning the past 8 years and the next 10 years; peak load hit an all-time-high 41.431 million kW on 2026-05-28, with AI power heavyweight TSMC the main driver of demand. Nuclear policy hangs on a referendum: KMT chair Cheng Li-wun plans to file a "restart nuclear power" referendum, and KMT legislators plan to file on July 3. Japan: the 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision on 2025-02-18, sets the 2040 power mix at 40-50% renewables, 20% nuclear and 30-40% thermal, and deletes the long-standing pledge to "reduce dependence on nuclear power as much as possible" in favor of "maximum utilization" of nuclear; data centers and semiconductor plants are pushing electricity demand up by about 5.37 million kW from 2024 to 2033 (roughly 5 nuclear reactors), Japan's first period of demand growth in 20 years. One AI power crunch, one shared turn to nuclear: Taiwan decides by referendum, Japan by cabinet decision. [F1][F2][F3][F4][F5][F6][F7][F8]

Main Text

The demand side: AI and data centers push power demand to a turning point

In 2026, energy policy in Taiwan and Japan was pushed to a turning point by the same force: the explosive growth of AI and data-center electricity use.

On the Taiwan side, minority shareholders at Taipower's 2026 shareholders' meeting pressed the company about TSMC as a mega power consumer and the massive electricity the AI industry will draw. Taipower chairman Tseng Wen-sheng stated plainly that "Taiwan's power supply must be sufficient to support the growth of the AI industry -- that is Taipower's responsibility." At 2:26 pm on 2026-05-28, Taiwan's peak load reached 41.431 million kW, an all-time high; Taipower also revised this year's forecasts, projecting a daytime peak of about 42.94 million kW and an evening peak of about 39.17 million kW (CNA #202606260314, CNA #202606260300). [F3]

On the Japan side, new and expanded data centers and semiconductor plants have pulled electricity demand back into growth after years of flat-to-declining consumption. According to METI's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, power demand from data centers and chip plants will grow by about 5.37 million kW from 2024 to 2033 (roughly equivalent to 5 nuclear reactors), which the plan frames as Japan's "first period of electricity demand growth in 20 years" (METI #7th-energy-plan). [F8]

The supply side: both invest heavily, both turn back to nuclear

On the Taiwan side, Taipower's funding needs have surged on the back of multiple power-construction projects plus natural-gas costs driven up by the Middle East conflict. With the Ministry of Economic Affairs' help, 8 state-affiliated banks earmarked a NT$300 billion special financing line (an earmarked line for future liquidity, not a lump-sum drawdown), available for the 26GW of new generation capacity Taipower has added over the past 8 years and will add over the next 10 years. But Taipower's finances are under heavy strain: in 2025 it posted a pre-tax profit of NT$75.6 billion on stabilizing fuel prices and tariff adjustments, ending 3 straight years of losses, yet accumulated losses still stand at NT$350 billion; in the first 4 months of 2026 it lost about NT$9 billion, and with the Middle East conflict pushing up fuel costs, the latest full-year forecast is a NT$28 billion loss (CNA #202606260300). [F1][F2]

On the Japan side, the 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision on 2025-02-18, sets the FY2040 power mix at 40-50% renewables (the largest source), 20% nuclear and 30-40% thermal. The pivotal turn: the long-standing pledge to "reduce dependence on nuclear power as much as possible" (JA: 「可能な限り原発依存度を低減する」) was deleted and replaced with "maximum utilization" of nuclear power -- the biggest turn in Japan's nuclear policy since the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Behind it stands the GX (Green Transformation) Promotion Act: a target of over JPY 150 trillion in public-private investment over the next 10 years and the issuance of JPY 20 trillion in GX economic transition bonds (METI #7th-energy-plan). [F6][F7][F8]

The fork: Taiwan decides by referendum, Japan by cabinet decision

The sharpest contrast lies in "how the decision gets made."

Taiwan's nuclear policy hangs on a referendum, a direct-democracy procedure. KMT chair Cheng Li-wun said on 2026-06-26 that what she plans to file is a "restart nuclear power" referendum, because the policy bears on overall national competitiveness, AI industry growth, electricity prices and defense resilience; she said she was repeatedly asked about Taiwan's energy policy during her US visit. KMT legislators have also reached a consensus with party headquarters and plan to file the nuclear referendum on July 3, with the referendum held alongside the year-end nine-in-one local elections (CNA #202606260242, CNA #202606260329). Taipower's position is to "act according to law": under current regulations, nuclear plants must shut down when their operating licenses expire, and Taipower will comply if policy changes; the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has already entered decommissioning, with equipment being dismantled (CNA #202606260314). [F4][F5]

Japan decides by cabinet decision (executive-led). The 7th Strategic Energy Plan went through a cabinet decision that wrote "maximum utilization" of nuclear and the 2040 nuclear share of 20% directly into the national energy framework, with no referendum required (METI #7th-energy-plan). [F6][F7]

One AI power crunch, one shared turn to nuclear -- Taiwan's is decided by referendum, Japan's by cabinet decision: a stark fork in energy decision-making procedures between two democratic systems.

Risk factors

• Referendum outcome undecided: Taiwan's nuclear referendum is still at the filing stage (planned filing on July 3, voting at year-end) and the outcome is open; an earlier referendum to restart the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant failed. This card describes the current state of the policy contest, not its ending.
• Reversibility of Taipower's finances: Taipower ended 3 straight loss-making years in 2025 thanks to stabilizing fuel prices and tariff adjustments, then swung to a forecast NT$28 billion full-year loss for 2026 as the Middle East conflict pushed fuel costs up; its results are tightly bound to international fuel prices.
• An earmark is not a drawdown: the NT$300 billion is an "earmarked line" of state-bank special financing, not a lump-sum drawdown; Tseng Wen-sheng said plainly it is "only an earmark, not funds needed this year," and it should not be read as money already deployed.
• Japan-side figures are policy estimates: the 5.37 million kW figure and the 2040 power-mix shares are policy targets and estimates in METI's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, not realized data; "roughly 5 nuclear reactors" is a conversion for comparison.
• No first-party financial filings: Taipower's hard figures are shareholders'-meeting statements relayed by CNA, and the Japan-side figures are METI policy-plan material as aggregated -- official_statement / news_aggregation, not official_number from TWSE/EDINET filings. Taipower is state-owned and unlisted.

FAQ

Q: What is the NT$300 billion special financing line Taipower earmarked at its 2026 shareholders' meeting for?

Taipower earmarked a NT$300 billion special financing line from 8 state-affiliated banks, available for the 26GW of new generation investment spanning the past 8 years and the next 10 years. It is an earmarked line, not a lump-sum drawdown, set aside for future liquidity.

Per CNA, minority shareholders at Taipower's 2026 shareholders' meeting asked what the NT$300 billion special financing is for. Taipower said it needs more funds because of multiple ongoing power-construction projects and the surge in the cost of natural gas for power generation caused by the Middle East conflict; the Ministry of Economic Affairs helped line up lending from 8 state-affiliated banks. Taipower president Tseng Wen-sheng explained that the NT$300 billion is only an earmark -- not funds needed this year -- that the line lowers Taipower's transaction costs, and that it can fund the 26GW of new generation capacity Taipower has added over the past 8 years and will add over the next 10 years (CNA #202606260300).

Q: How are Taipower's finances?

Taipower posted a pre-tax profit of NT$75.6 billion in 2025, ending 3 straight loss-making years, but accumulated losses still stand at NT$350 billion; it lost about NT$9 billion in the first 4 months of 2026, and the latest full-year forecast is a NT$28 billion loss.

Per CNA, Taipower benefited in 2025 from stabilizing international fuel prices and electricity tariff adjustments, posting a pre-tax profit of NT$75.6 billion and ending 3 straight years of losses, though accumulated losses remain at NT$350 billion. Spokesperson Huang Mei-lien said that with the Middle East conflict pushing up fuel costs, Taipower lost about NT$9 billion in the first 4 months of 2026; factoring in CPC Corporation's April and May natural-gas price hikes, the latest full-year forecast is a NT$28 billion loss; if fuel prices fall and CPC cuts prices, the loss could narrow (CNA #202606260300).

Q: Where does Taiwan's nuclear referendum stand?

KMT chair Cheng Li-wun said on 2026-06-26 she would file a "restart nuclear power" referendum; KMT legislators plan to file on July 3, and the referendum will be held alongside the year-end nine-in-one local elections. Taipower's position is to follow the law: under current rules, nuclear plants shut down when their operating licenses expire.

Per CNA, Cheng Li-wun said in remarks on 2026-06-26 that what she plans to file is precisely a "restart nuclear power" referendum, because the policy bears on overall national competitiveness, AI industry growth, electricity prices and defense resilience; she also hopes the year-end referendum questions stay concentrated on the first and second cases. KMT legislators have likewise reached a consensus with party headquarters and plan to file the nuclear referendum on July 3. Taipower chairman Tseng Wen-sheng said Taipower acts according to law -- under current regulations nuclear plants must shut down when their operating licenses expire, and Taipower will comply if policy changes; the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has entered decommissioning (CNA #202606260242, CNA #202606260329, CNA #202606260314).

Q: How has Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan changed its stance on nuclear power?

Adopted by cabinet decision on 2025-02-18, Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan deletes the long-standing pledge to "reduce dependence on nuclear power as much as possible," switches to "maximum utilization" of nuclear power, and sets nuclear at 20% of the 2040 power mix -- the biggest nuclear-policy turn since the Fukushima accident.

According to METI's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, the FY2040 power mix is set at 40-50% renewables (the largest source), 20% nuclear and 30-40% thermal. Most important, the long-standing policy phrase pledging to "reduce dependence on nuclear power as much as possible" was deleted and replaced with "maximum utilization" of nuclear -- the biggest turn in Japan's nuclear-policy stance since the Fukushima Daiichi accident (METI #7th-energy-plan).

Q: Why call AI and data centers the driver of this round of energy-policy turns?

Taiwan's peak load hit an all-time-high 41.431 million kW on 2026-05-28 with TSMC the leading AI power consumer; in Japan, data centers and semiconductor plants are pushing electricity demand up by about 5.37 million kW from 2024 to 2033 -- the first demand-growth phase in 20 years.

On the Taiwan side, minority shareholders at Taipower's 2026 shareholders' meeting raised TSMC's outsized power use and the AI industry's consumption, and chairman Tseng Wen-sheng stated plainly that supply must be sufficient to support the AI industry; peak load hit an all-time-high 41.431 million kW on May 28 (CNA #202606260314, CNA #202606260300). On the Japan side, according to METI's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, power demand from data centers and chip plants will grow by about 5.37 million kW from 2024 to 2033 (roughly 5 nuclear reactors), which Japan frames as its first period of electricity demand growth in 20 years (METI #7th-energy-plan).

F-Units

F-001: At its 2026 shareholders' meeting, Taipower earmarked a special financing line of NT$300 billion from 8 state-affiliated banks, available for the 26GW of new generation investment spanning the past 8 years and the next 10 years (an earmarked line, not a lump-sum drawdown)

• source: CNA #202606260300
• source_url: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202606260300.aspx
• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement
• period: 2026-06-26
• caveat: Shareholders'-meeting statements by Taipower relayed by CNA, not TWSE/EDINET filings; the NT$300 billion is an earmarked line, not disbursed funds

F-002: Taipower posted a pre-tax profit of NT$75.6 billion in 2025, ending 3 straight loss-making years, with accumulated losses still at NT$350 billion; it lost about NT$9 billion in the first 4 months of 2026, and the latest full-year forecast is a NT$28 billion loss

• source: CNA #202606260300
• source_url: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202606260300.aspx
• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement
• period: 2026-06-26
• caveat: Shareholders'-meeting statements by Taipower relayed by CNA; 2026 results are tightly bound to international fuel prices

F-003: Taiwan's peak load reached an all-time-high 41.431 million kW on 2026-05-28; Taipower chairman Tseng Wen-sheng said supply must be sufficient to support AI industry growth, with TSMC a leading AI power consumer

• source: CNA #202606260300
• source_type: CNA
• source_article_id: 202606260314
• source_url: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202606260300.aspx
• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement
• period: 2026-05-28
• caveat: Peak-load figure disclosed by Taipower's spokesperson at the shareholders' meeting, relayed by CNA

F-004: KMT chair Cheng Li-wun said on 2026-06-26 she plans to file a "restart nuclear power" referendum, citing national competitiveness, AI industry growth, electricity prices and defense resilience; the referendum would be held alongside the year-end nine-in-one local elections

• source: CNA #202606260242
• source_url: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202606260242.aspx
• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement
• period: 2026-06-26
• caveat: Cheng Li-wun's remarks in an interview relayed by CNA; the referendum is still at the filing stage and the outcome is open

F-005: KMT legislators reached a consensus with party headquarters and plan to file the nuclear referendum on 2026-07-03; Taipower's position is to act according to law -- under current regulations nuclear plants shut down when operating licenses expire -- and the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant has entered decommissioning

• source: CNA #202606260329
• source_url: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202606260329.aspx
• confidence: high
• basis: official_statement
• period: 2026-06-26
• caveat: Referendum filing progress relayed by CNA; the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant's decommissioning per the Taipower chairman's shareholders'-meeting remarks (CNA #202606260314)

F-006: Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision on 2025-02-18, sets the FY2040 power mix at 40-50% renewables, 20% nuclear and 30-40% thermal

• source: METI #7th-energy-plan
• source_url: https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/others/basic_plan/
• confidence: high
• basis: news_aggregation
• period: 2025-02-18
• caveat: Policy targets of METI's 7th Strategic Energy Plan; the 2040 power mix is an estimated target, not realized data

F-007: The 7th Strategic Energy Plan deletes the long-standing phrase pledging to "reduce dependence on nuclear power as much as possible" (JA: 「可能な限り原発依存度を低減」) and switches to "maximum utilization" of nuclear -- the biggest turn in Japan's nuclear policy since the Fukushima disaster

• source: METI #7th-energy-plan
• source_url: https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/others/basic_plan/
• confidence: high
• basis: news_aggregation
• period: 2025-02-18
• caveat: A change of wording in METI's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, aggregated from public policy material

F-008: In Japan, data centers and semiconductor plants are pushing electricity demand up by about 5.37 million kW from 2024 to 2033 (roughly 5 nuclear reactors), Japan's first period of demand growth in 20 years; the GX Promotion Act targets over JPY 150 trillion in public-private investment over 10 years and issues JPY 20 trillion in GX economic transition bonds

• source: METI #7th-energy-plan
• source_url: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/energy_environment/global_warming/gx.html
• confidence: medium
• basis: news_aggregation
• period: 2024-2033
• caveat: The 5.37 million kW figure is METI's demand estimate and "roughly 5 nuclear reactors" a conversion for comparison; JPY 150 trillion is the GX investment target

J-Units

J-001: The same surge in AI/data-center power use pushed Taiwan (all-time-high 41.431 million kW peak on May 28, TSMC as the leading consumer) and Japan (DC + semiconductors adding about 5.37 million kW of demand over 2024-2033, the first growth phase in 20 years) to energy-policy turning points at the same time -- the driver is one and the same

• confidence: high
• basis_f_units: F-003, F-008

J-002: Both invest heavily and turn back to nuclear, but through opposite procedures -- Taiwan's nuclear policy hangs on a referendum (direct democracy: Cheng Li-wun planning to file, KMT legislators filing on July 3), while Japan decides by cabinet decision (executive-led: the 7th plan deletes "reduce nuclear dependence" and sets nuclear at 20%); one AI power crunch, two opposite decision paths

• confidence: high
• basis_f_units: F-004, F-005, F-006, F-007

J-003: The financial and institutional backstops of the two nuclear turns differ -- Taiwan's state-owned Taipower earmarks NT$300 billion in state-bank financing to back 26GW of investment while carrying NT$350 billion of accumulated losses and a forecast NT$28 billion full-year loss; Japan's turn rests on the GX Promotion Act's JPY 150 trillion public-private investment framework -- a contrast of "state enterprise under strain vs national framework"

• confidence: medium
• basis_f_units: F-001, F-002, F-008

P-Units

P-001: Taiwan's nuclear referendum filing and outcome -- planned filing on 2026-07-03 with voting alongside the year-end nine-in-one elections; whether it passes and its actual effect on nuclear policy need follow-up; an earlier referendum to restart the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant failed

• status: open

P-002: The implementation gap of Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan -- 20% nuclear and 40-50% renewables by 2040 are policy targets; actual restart progress and power-mix attainment need later verification

• status: open

P-003: The durability of AI/data-center demand growth -- both turns are tightly tied to AI/semiconductor capital spending; if the supercycle cools, whether demand growth and the justification for both nuclear investment pushes roll back needs observation

• status: open

同事件・三視角 / Three Perspectives on the Same Event / 同一イベント・三つの視点

• 繁體中文
• 日本語
• English

Internal Citation Chain

Published ANK-Doc cited in this piece:

• ANK-2026-06-24-003 (AI data centers hit the grid: Taiwan and Japan pivot together to "grid-scale storage + interconnection discipline" governance) -> That card and this one share the "AI/data-center power shock" axis but complement each other: ANK-2026-06-24-003 focuses on the technical-governance layer of grid dispatch, storage and interconnection, while this card rises to the energy-policy and decision-procedure layer of "power crunch -> nuclear-policy turn" (Taiwan's referendum vs Japan's cabinet decision). The two cards read together as "technical governance vs policy decision."

Sources

1. [CNA #202606260300] 中央社, "公股銀3000億專案融資 台電：支應26GW發電裝置投資", 2026-06-26. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202606260300.aspx
2. [CNA #202606260314] 中央社, "小股東建議邀黃仁勳參觀核四 台電：主隨客便", 2026-06-26. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/afe/202606260314.aspx
3. [CNA #202606260242] 中央社, "暫不推鞭刑公投 鄭麗文擬提重啟核電公投", 2026-06-26. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202606260242.aspx
4. [CNA #202606260329] 中央社, "藍委拜會鄭麗文達共識 擬7/3提核電、鞭刑公投案", 2026-06-26. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202606260329.aspx
5. [METI #7th-energy-plan] 経済産業省 資源エネルギー庁, "エネルギー基本計画について（第7次、2025年2月18日閣議決定）". https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/others/basic_plan/
6. [ANK-2026-06-24-003] 竹之內 凜, "AI資料中心衝擊電網，台日同步轉向「系統用蓄電＋併網規律」治理", 2026-06-24. https://ainews.washinmura.jp/ainews/zh/ank/ANK-2026-06-24-003